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Business Associations 
by Roland E. Brandel* 
Because the law governing business associations is in large 
part codified and subject to administrative regulation, this 
article will emphasize new legislation and changes in policies 
of agencies charged with the enforcement of that law. The 
most sweeping changes were accomplished by regulations 
issued by the commissioner of corporations, but there were 
also several noteworthy amendments and additions to statutes 
affecting corporations. Additionally, major changes to the 
Corporate Securities Law are now before the legislaturel and 
passage of a bill is expected during 1968. Neither space 
nor time permits a definitive analysis of the multitude of recent 
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1. Assembly Bill 1 (1968) Reg. Sess. 
Cal. Legis. (1968). Where topics under 
discussion below can be related to the 
proposed legislative revision, an attempt 
has been made to do so. 
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cases involving aspects of the law relating to business asso-
ciations. Where a case has caused some change in the prior 
law, however, an attempt has been made to signal that change 
and to provide some appraisal of the rules of law it promul-
gates. 
The Corporate Entity 
As a general rule, a corporation is a distinct legal entity 
that accumulates rights and incurs liabilities apart from the 
natural persons, such as directors, officers and shareholders, 
who are associated with it. The California courts, however, 
liberally exercise a technique of piercing the corporate veil:! 
to reach behind the separate nature of the corporate entity in 
order to prevent injustice. The court of appeal did so in 
Schoenberg v. Koutnik. 3 The decision held a husband and 
wife liable under the alter ego theory for the debts of an 
under-capitalized, but very successful, corporation of which 
they were the sole shareholders. Because of the under-
capitalization and the fact that corporate and personal finances 
were inextricably intertwined, application of the equitable 
doctrine that disregards the corporate entity was hardly sur-
prising.4 
The alter ego theory was also applied, but with a less typical 
result, in Ivy v. Plyler.5 The defendant, Plyler, was an officer 
and director of Lupine Oil Operations and operated that 
corporation in such a manner that application of the doctrine 
of alter ego was inevitable if an attempted interposition of 
the liability shield ordinarily provided by the corporate entity 
portended harm to plaintiff. Plaintiff sued Plyler for amounts 
due on certain contracts plaintiff had performed for Lupine 
Oil. Plyler's response was to obtain a discharge in bank-
ruptcy, which he claimed barred suit on the debt. The court 
held that Plyler was responsible for the corporate debts under 
the alter ego theory and further that he was guilty of mis-
2. See generally 12 Cal. Jur.2d, Cor-
porations § 8. 
3. 251 Cal. App.2d 154, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
359 (1967). 
4 CAL LAW 1967 
4. See Automotriz del Golfo de Cali-
fornia v. Resnick, 47 Cal.2d 792, 306 
P.2d 1, 63 AL.R.2d 1042 (1957). 
5. 246 Cal. App.2d 678, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
894 (1966). 
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appropriation and defalcation when he withdrew corporate 
funds for his personal use. Hence, plaintiff's debt was not 
one dischargeable in bankruptcy under the provisions of sec-
tion 17 ( a) ( 4) of the Bankruptcy Act.6 
Although the result reached is not unique, it would seem 
that the route chosen is. The doctrine of alter ego "disregards 
the corporate entity and holds the individual responsible for 
acts knowingly and intentionally done in the name of the 
corporation."7 The acts of the corporation in incurring the 
debt, which were attributable to Plyler under this rule, were 
not those that the Bankruptcy Act singles out as creating 
nondischargeable debts. Further, Plyler's actions vis-a-vis 
the corporation, in his fiduciary capacity, did not directly 
create any debt owed plaintiff. The debt was clearly ante-
cedent to Plyler's breach of fiduciary duty and was created 
by corporate acts attributable to Plyler by application of the 
alter ego theory. It can be argued that Plyler's misconduct, 
if any, occurred in his relationship to the corporation and 
its property and would create a right of recovery by the 
corporate entity or one standing in the shoes of the cor-
poration. Most cases involving corporations arising under 
17 (a) (4) in fact involve recovery by the corporation itself8 
or by a party, such as a receiver,9 trustee10 or surety,!1 who 
6. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(4) (1964). 
7. 246 Cal. App.2d at 682, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. at 897. 
8. See Citizens Mut. Automobile Ins. 
Co. v. Gardner, 315 Mich. 689, 24 N.W. 
2d 410 (1946); Airo Supply Co. v. Page, 
2 Ill. App.2d 264, 119 N.E.2d 400 
(1954). 
9. See In re DeGraaf, 22 F.2d 163 
(S.D. Mich. [1927]); Harper v. Rankin, 
141 F. 626, 72 C.C.A. 320 (4th Cir. 
[1905]); McNeill v. Savin, 244 Wis. 552, 
13 N.W.2d 82 (1944). 
10. See In re Hammond, 98 F.2d 703 
= (2d Cir. [1938]); Kaufman v. Lederfine, 
49 F.Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. [1943]); Floyd 
v. Layton, 172 N.C. 64, 89 S.E. 998 
(1916); Bannon v. Knauss, 57 Ohio App. 
288, 13 N.E.2d 733 (1937). 
11. See National Surety Co. v. Wit-
tich, 185 Minn. 321, 240 N.W. 888 
(1932); National Surety Co. v. Lanza, 
42 N.Y.S.2d 370 (Sup. Ct. 1943). These 
cases allowed the surety to stand in the 
corporate creditor's shoes through sub-
rogation (see Johnson v. Mortgage 
Guar. Co., 117 Cal. App. at 421, 4 
P.2d at 210 [1931]), but not all surety-
ship cases can be thus explained. A 
second line of suretyship cases can be 
explained under statutory language, as 
in the cases arising under the New York 
Stock Corporation Law, because the act 
of misappropriation itself created the 
debt to the surety and hence would be 
a transaction falling within the literal 
terms of the Bankruptcy Act. See 
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. 
CAL LAW 1967 5 
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stands in place of the corporation. Several New York cases 
have allowed recovery by creditors of a corporate entity 
against an officer or director. They are atypical, however, 
and can be explained by the specific provisions of section 
15 of the New York Stock Corporation Law, which made 
the very act of misappropriation or defalcation an act that 
created a debt owed to the creditors.12 Such a debt therefore 
falls precisely within the words of the statute as one "created 
by [the bankrupt's] fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, 
or defalcation while acting as an officer. . . "13 
Allowing a claim of a creditor of a corporation to survive 
the bankruptcy of an officer because of section 17 (a) ( 4) is 
not without precedent, although none of the precedents in-
volved application of the alter ego doctrine.14 The decision 
raises doubt, however, whether its rule is correct in light 
of the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act; whether defendant's 
activity was serious misconduct of the type intended to be 
covered by section 17 (a) ( 4 ) ;15 and whether the recovery 
should properly have been corporate and therefore for the 
benefit of all creditors. 
As to the alter ego doctrine per se, defendant argued in 
Ivy that if he and the corporation were to be treated as 
one, then he committed no wrong by treating corporate prop-
erty as his own. Following that argument briefly, one could 
say that it is not atypical to find that sole proprietorships 
are incorporated with no contemporaneous change in organ-
ization or practices and that the alter ego doctrine properly 
disregards the corporate existence to protect third parties. 
It would seem, however, that placing the third party in the 
position where he has access to all of defendant's personal 
assets would be sufficient to compensate for defendant's only 
Flanagan, 28 F.Supp. at 419 (S.D. Ohio 
[1939]). 
12. In re Bernard, 87 F.2d at 707 
(2d Cir. [1937]); In re Adelson, 187 
Misc. 691, 65 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Sup. ct. 
1946). 
13. 11 U.S.C. § 35 (a)(4) (1964). 
6 CAL LAW 1967 
14. In re Metz, 6 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 
[1925]); Banks v. Coming Bank & Trust 
Co., 188 Ark. 841, 68 S.W.2d 452 
(1934); Tatum v. Leigh, 136 Ga. 791, 
72 S.E. 236 (1911). 
15. See Cowan, BANKRUPTCY LAW 
AND PRACTICE, §§ 472, 479 (1963). 
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real wrong, which was the creation of an illusion of a separate 
corporate entity where none existed. 
If Ivy is now good law, one fact is crystal-clear. Incorpora-
tion of a small business may not only fail to provide the 
protection from liability anticipated by creation of the sepa-
rate entity; it may also cause individuals, in the event their 
corporate and individual financial affairs fail, to lose the 
ordinary protections afforded by the Bankruptcy Act. Adopt-
ing the corporate form as a form only, while intermingling 
corporate and personal finances as if the business were still a 
sole proprietorship, may cause an exposure to risk of unlim-
ited personal liability. 
Another case, which denied to a state agency, the State 
Board of Medical Examiners, the ability to pierce the corpo-
rate veil seems to be a retrenchment from the liberal use of the 
technique evidenced by Ivy. Sections 654 and 4080.5 of the 
Business and Professions Code operate to deny physicians 
and surgeons licensed to practice in California the right to 
own or operate pharmacies. These provisions per se and 
their applicability under particular circumstances were at-
tacked on many grounds, including unconstitutionality, by a 
host of medical practitioners who, under several different busi-
ness forms, either operated or desired to operate phar-
macies. The court of appeal in Magan Medical Clinic v. 
State Board of Medical Examiners16 engaged in an extensive 
analysis of the social evil at which the legislation was directed. 
Since shady practices might result when a conflict of interest 
exists between the welfare of patients and economic partici-
pation of doctors in lucrative prescription-filling businesses, 
the court held that the legislation, designed to forestall such 
a conflict of interest, was constitutional. In response to the 
argument that the literal language of the legislation prohib-
ited only individuals from having an ownership interest, the 
court in construing the intent of the statute said: 
16. 249 Cal. App.2d 124, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. 256 (1967). 
CAL LAW 1967 7 
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It is obvious that the statute would be completely frus-
trated if all that was necessary to circumvent the statute 
was for two doctors to form a partnership, and then 
operate a pharmacy where neither could . operate 
as such individually.17 
Such a rationale would seem equally applicable to the 
case of one or more doctors who use the corporate form to 
circumvent the prohibition of these statutes. The court did 
not foreclose that alternative, however, but ruled instead that 
doctors may own pharmacies through the simple expedient 
of using the corporate business form.ls The court deemed 
itself compelled to interpret the statutes strictly because "the 
statutes here involve penalties or forfeitures. "19 The 
court may also have had some reservations about the con-
stitutionality of a rule that would deprive all doctors of the 
right to participate in even minor shareholding of such enter-
prises as large chain drugstores. If the latter were the persua-
sive factor, either on constitutional or general policy grounds, 
it might be ventured that a preferable result would be to allow 
the corporate form to be ignored in those situations where 
the corporation is merely the alter ego of a small group of 
physicians or where doctors have clear control over manage-
ment or disbursement of profits. Those situations must nec-
essarily be within the scope of the statute if the statute is to 
be effective, but the court might have compromised by stating 
that corporate ownership per se is not a violation of the 
statute.20 
17. 249 Cal. App.2d at 136, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. at 264. 
18. The court reached the same con-
clusion in a companion case in in-
terpreting the statutory provision (Cal. 
Bus. & Prof. Code § 4080.5) that pro-
hibited the future licensing of doctors 
to operate pharmacies. Warrack Med. 
Center Hosp. v. State Bd. of Pharm., 
249 Cal. App.2d 118, 57 Cal. Rptr. 85 
(1967). In Warrack, however, a clear 
alternative ground for the decision also 
existed. 
19. 249 Cal. App.2d at 138, 57 Cal. 
8 CAL LAW 1967 
Rptr. at 266. It should be noted here 
that the legislation was passed in 1963, 
but did not require physicians who had 
a prohibited interest in a pharmacy to 
divest their interest until July 1, 1967. 
The action here, then, was one for 
declaratory relief, not for relief from 
any immediate sanction. 
20. Compare the provisions of Cal. 
Bus. & Prof. Code § 25502, which im-
poses more carefully drawn restrictions 
on ownership of liquor sales outlets. 
The court found the explicitness of that 
statute an indication that the instant 
6
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Another aspect of the corporation as an entity is its exist-
ence as a creature of the state. Thus, the state may utilize 
sanctions, such as suspending or terminating the very exist-
ence of the corporation, which are not applicable to natural 
persons. The California Supreme Court last year mitigated 
the potentially harsh effects of a suspension of a corporation's 
powers for failure to pay corporate franchise taxes pursuant 
to Revenue and Taxation Code section 23301. In The 
Traub Company v. Coffee Break Service, Inc./ the court made 
clear that since the issue of incapacity of a corporation to 
sue or defend a suit because of section 23301 was one only 
of abatement, the section should be strictly construed against 
the one asserting the incapacity. The specific issue in Traub 
was cross-defendant's contention that a judgment in favor of 
cross-complainant Coffee Break Service, Inc. could be col-
laterally attacked because of incapacity based on such a sus-
pension.2 The court disapproved language in Belle Vista v. 
Hassen,3 which allowed such a collateral attack, and held that 
the judgment could not be vacated on such a ground unless 
the essential facts appeared in the judgment roll. The opinion 
distinguished those cases where the corporate entity no longer 
existed. 4 
The court seems to have correctly decided that the legisla-
ture did not intend Revenue and Taxation Code section 23301 
to operate as a forfeiture of substantive rights by virtue of 
an inability to defend suits. The "penalty" incurred by such 
a forfeiture would be totally unrelated to the seriousness of the 
offense except by coincidence. Rather, the court seems to 
view the statute's purpose as providing an impetus to rectify 
tax delinquencies by denying access to the state courts so 
long as the suspension is in effect. 
statute was meant to have a more 
limited scope. See also Schoenberg v. 
Koutnik, 251 Cal. App.2d at 167, 59 
Cal. Rptr. at 367 (1967). 
1. 66 Cal.2d 368, 57 Cal. Rptr. 846, 
425 P.2d 790 (1967). 
2. See Smith v. Lewis, 211 Cal. at 
298, 300, 295 P. at 39 (1930). Both 
the reasoning of Traub and Reed v. 
Norman, 48 Cal.2d at 343-344, 309 
P.2d at 812 (1957) weaken the continu-
ing validity of Smith. 
3. 227 Cal. App.2d 837, 39 Cal. Rptr. 
184 (1964). 
4. See cases cited in The Traub Co. 
v. Coffee Break Serv., Inc., 66 Cal.2d 
at 371, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 848, 425 P.2d 
at 792. 
CAL LAW 1967 9 
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A similar sensitivity to the harshness of a forfeiture of 
substantive rights was apparent in the opinion in Old Fashion 
Farms v. Hamrick. 5 Plaintiff, Old Fashion Farms, brought 
an action for declaratory relief and specific performance of 
an oral agreement to enter into a written lease and option to 
purchase real property. Plaintiff had come under the suspen-
sion of Revenue and Taxation Code section 23301 after the 
pleadings, but prior to commencement of the trial. When the 
defendant raised the issue of incapacity, plaintiff moved for 
a thirty-day continuance to seek reinstatement. The court 
denied the motion and was upheld by the court of appeal. 
One could argue that a suspended corporation has no existence 
and hence even entertainment of a motion for a continuance 
is improper. The court held, however, that hearing such a 
motion and granting a continuance were in the sound discre-
tion of the trial court, which discretion should be exercised in 
the light of the substantive issues at stake in the proceedings. 
The court upheld the denial of the motion for a continuance, 
but only after stating that "our independent examination of 
the contract shows that it could not be 
specifically enforced in any event,"6 and that plaintiff had 
failed to make any effort to revive its good standing in the 
four months prior to the making of its motion. 
Relationships Affected by the Corporate Entity 
Transactions between a corporation and its directors are 
closely scrutinized by the courts and are subject to the general 
rule that the burden of proving the reasonableness or fairness 
of such transactions is on the fiduciary.7 On the other hand, 
transactions between a director or officer and a third party 
are presumed not only to be within the scope of authority, 
5. 253 Cal. App.2d 273, 61 Cal. Rptr. 
254 (1967). 
6. Given the demonstrated desire of 
the California courts to resolve substan-
tive rights on substantive grounds, it 
would be interesting to speculate on 
whether the harsher rule now appar-
ently applicable to foreign corporations 
will endure. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. 
10 CAL LAW 1967 
Code § 23301; Alhambra-Shumway 
Mines, Inc. v. Alhambra Gold Mine 
Corp., 155 Cal. App.2d at 50-51, 317 
P.2d at 652 (1957). 
7. See, e.g., Tevis v. Beigel, 156 Cal. 
App.2d at 15, 319 P.2d at 102-103 
(1957); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remil-
lard-Dandini, 109 Cal. App.2d at 420, 
241 P.2d 66, 75 (1952). 
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but also to be in good faith. Therefore, the burden of proof 
is on the party challenging such transactions.s The court of 
appeal, in Thompson v. Price,9 seems to have blurred 
this distinction. In that case, plaintiff, in part, sought to 
recover salaries and fees paid out by the corporation to de-
fendant directors A and B, and a secretary. Neither the 
secretary nor B performed services of value for the corpo-
ration. The trial court found that plaintiffs had not proved 
the unfairness and unreasonableness of the salaries and fees 
sought to be recovered, except for a small portion. The court 
of appeal, in holding that the burden of proof had been im-
properly placed, stated that since A was a director, an officer 
(general manager) and the attorney for the corporation, he 
owed a fiduciary duty that required him to prove the drawings 
he "manipulated" were fair and reasonable, including the dis-
persal of funds to the secretary. 
It is clear that the court was correct in concluding that since 
A and B were directors contracting with the corporation, 
under the general rule they must assume the burden of proving 
the reasonableness of the salaries paid to themselves by the 
corporation. But the salary paid to A's secretary presents a 
different situation. Here, from the facts given in the case, 
the secretary appeared to be a third party with whom the 
corporation contracted through defendant A. Although she 
was also employed by A in his individual capacity, no evi-
dence of personal benefit for director A was introduced. Yet 
A was required to prove the fairness and reasonableness of 
the salary paid to the secretary. The application to this latter 
transaction of the general rule that requires a fiduciary in his 
dealings with the corporation to prove fairness and reason-
ableness appears to be an extension of that rule. Although 
the entire handling of the corporate affairs by defendant A ap-
pears to have been replete with fraud, the court's mere charac-
8. See Childress v. Dinkelspiel Co., 
Inc., 203 Cal. at 263, 263 P. at 802 
(1928); Olson v. Basin Oil Co., 136 
Cal. App.2d at 559, 288 P.2d at 962 
(1955); Koshaba v. Koshaba, 56 Cal. 
App.2d at 313, 132 P.2d at 861 (1942); 
Fornaseri v. Cosmosart Realty & Bldg. 
Corp., 96 Cal. App. at 557, 274 P. at 
600 (1929); 3 Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA 
CORPS., § 921 (1965). 
9. 251 Cal. App.2d 182, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
174 (1967). 
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terization of the particular drawing as one "manipulated" by 
defendant A, rather than made in the course of business, seems 
insufficient to shift the burden of proof. It is submitted that, 
absent proof of self-serving interests in the particular trans-
action, the rule requiring plaintiff to prove misdealing best 
adjusts the balance between the need for easy recourse against 
corporate fiduciaries and the continued need for flexibility and 
freedom of corporate fiduciaries to meet business demands. 
The courts also made progress in further defining the scope 
of remedies available against corporate fiduciaries. Gen-
erally, a showing of actual injury and an award of compen-
satory damages is required in order to justify a recovery of 
punitive damages.lO Authority exists, however, for the addi-
tional proposition that the requirements of the rule are met 
where it is shown that a tort entitling the plaintiff to compen-
satory damages was clearly proven, but no actual award of 
compensatory damages was made. l1 This latter rule was 
applied in the corporate area in Topanga Corporation v. 
Gentile,12 where punitive damages against a promoter who 
had fraudulently acquired a substantial interest in plaintiff 
corporation were allowed. Defendane3 and others were pro-
moters of plaintiff corporation which had been formed for 
the purpose of purchasing a parcel of land. Each investor's 
contribution purchased a proportionate stock interest in the 
corporation and was to be used to pay for the property to 
be purchased. Defendant conducted the negotiations for the 
purchase of the property and indicated to the other pro-
moters that the purchase price was $210,000. As part of 
the down payment to finance the purchase, defendant agreed 
10. See Clark v. McClurg, 215 Cal. 
at 282-83, 4 P.2d at ISO-lSI, 9 P.2d 
at 506, 81 A.L.R. at 910-911 (1931); 
Kluge v. O'Gara, 227 Cal. App.2d at 
209, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 608 (1964); Hay-
del v. Morton, 8 Cal. App.2d at 736-37, 
48 P.2d at 712 (1935); Chavez v. Times-
Mirror Co., 72 Cal. App. at 697, 237 
P. at 1086-87 (1925); Prosser, TORTS 
13 (3d ed. 1964). 
11. Finney v. Lockhart, 35 Cal.2d 
12 CAL LAW 1967 
at 163-64, 217 P.2d at 21 (1950); Clark 
v. McClurg, 215 Cal. at 284-85, 4 P.2d 
at 151-152,9 P.2d at 506-07, 81 A.L.R. 
at 911-912 (1931); Sterling Drug, Inc. 
v. Benatar, 99 Cal. App.2d at 400-03, 
221 P.2d at 970-71 (1950). 
12. 249 Cal. App.2d 681, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. 713 (1967). 
13. A husband and wife were code-
fendants in Topanga but they will be 
referred to in the singular. 
10
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to cOIltribute a ranch, which he falsely represented as being 
worth $70,000, for a one-third interest in the corporation. 
The ranch was in fact worth only $10,000. The court of 
appeal affirmed the trial court's cancellation of the entire 
original issue of stock and order to reissue stock in proportion 
to the promoters' actual investment, but reversed its determi-
nation that no authority existed to grant punitive damages. 
In holding that plaintiff was entitled to a determination 
of the issue of punitive damages on its merits, the court stated 
that "the fact that plaintiffs were not given a grant of mone-
tary damages of a certain amount is not determinative."14 
The court concluded that plaintiff was indeed damaged by 
defendant's fraud, since he had not received stock commen-
surate in value to his contribution to the corporation. The 
disregard of the strict rule, requiring an actual award of 
compensatory damages as a prerequisite to punitive damages, 
appears to make particularly good sense in Topanga because 
the relief awarded was clearly in effect an order requiring 
defendants to give up a property interest to plaintiffs that 
could have been translated into monetary terms. 
The state legislature dealt with a director's duty of 
care by amending section 829/5 which specifies those sources 
of financial information upon which a director may rely 
without fear of incurring subsequent liability for negligent 
violation of section 824. The latter section prohibits author-
ization by directors of certain transactions between a cor-
poration and its shareholders except as provided for by statute. 
The amendment ratifies common business practices by making 
it clear that a director may rely on financial statements 
certified by certified public accountants, as well as those of 
public accountants. 
The courts also resolved a previously unsettled issue in the 
relationship of shareholders inter sese. In almost all states, 
the notion that the proportionate share of capital investment 
of shareholders is the significant criterion for determining the 
14.249 Cal. App.2d at 691, 58 Cal. 15. All statutory citations are to the 
Rptr. at 719. California Corporations Code, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
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right of control through voting has replaced the notion of one 
man, one vote, that existed at early common law. However, 
the question of the precision with which proportional repre-
sentation should equate with investment, that is, whether 
fractional voting should be permissible, rarely has been faced 
by the judiciary.16 Some states provide expressly by statute 
for the right to vote fractional shares;17 others, such as Cali-
fornia, imply that fractional shares may be voted, by permit-
ting disenfranchisement of fractional shares in the articles or 
bylaws of a corporation. IS A widely cited Pennsylvania case,19 
on which much secondary authority is based, held that absent 
a legislative provision authorizing the voting of fractional 
shares, such voting is prohibited. 
Garnier v. Garnier20 decided the related but more unusual 
point whether an owner of a whole share may split that share 
into fractional votes. 1 Four of the nine shareholders of 
Garnier Enterprises, Inc. voted such a fractional vote in an 
election of directors, the result of which was a victory for 
their three candidates by one-third of a vote. The losers 
brought an action to determine the validity of the election 
and both the trial and appellate courts held that "only whole 
votes may be cast by persons holding only whole shares, 
absent some contrary provision in the articles or bylaws.,,2 
Commentators have indicated that fractional shares per se 
present problems3 and fractional voting assumedly would 
merely add to those problems. The argument in favor of frac-
tional voting is that a stockholder's voting rights should be 
coextensive with his pecuniary interest in the corporation. 
Such an argument, however, does not carryover to split 
voting of whole shares. Even though such voting has oc-
16. See Ann. 98 A.L.R.2d 361 (1964). 
17. See, e.g., Ore. Rev. Stat. § 57.126 
(1953); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.19 (1957). 
18. Cal. Corp. Code § 2215. 
19. Commonwealth ex reI. Cart-
wright v. Cartwright, 350 Pa. 638, 40 
A.2d 30, 155 A.L.R. 1088 (1944). 
20. 248 Cal. App.2d 255, 56 Cal. 
Rptr. 247 (1967). 
14 CAL LAW 1967 
1. The Cartwright case also presented 
the issue whether the vote of a whole 
share may be split, but the court did 
not directly decide that issue. 
2. 248 Cal. App.2d at 259, 56 Cal. 
Rptr. at 250. 
3. See Sobieski, Fractional Shares in 
Stock Dividends and Splits, 16 Bus. Law 
204, 205 (1960). 
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curred in California before,4 it seems that no persuasive policy 
reason exists to warrant splitting whole votes and that Garnier 
therefore presents the proper resolution of the issue. Hence, 
in California today, voting of fractional shares is permissible 
unless the corporation expressly forbids it, and splitting of 
whole votes is not permissible unless the corporation expressly 
allows it. 
Voting, though, is only one method of ownership control 
of corporate transactions. A more direct method is that of 
a suit brought by a shareholder against a party who has 
wronged the corporation. Section 834 sets forth required con-
ditions precedent before an individual may bring such a deriv-
ative action on behalf of a corporation or an unincorporated 
association. The section's function is to provide some meas-
ure of protection from strike suits,5 which are derivative 
actions brought to achieve some covert personal gain for the 
litigator. One feature of the section has been to grant some 
measure of protection from the adverse effects of spurious 
litigation by allowing the corporation or a defendant director 
or officer to move that the court require the plaintiff to furnish 
security in an amount fixed by the court to cover "reasonable 
expenses, including attorney's fees, which may be incurred by 
the moving party and the corporation in connection with such 
action, including expenses for which said corporation may 
become liable pursuant to Section 830."6 If the court deter-
mines that security should be furnished, the action is dis-
missed unless it is furnished within a reasonable time. 
Without the security provision, corporations might be co-
erced by such suits into paying a settlement to a plaintiff by 
4. See Dulin v. Pacific Wood & Coal 
Co., 103 Cal. 357, 35 P. 1045, 37 P. 
207 (1894); Edward Sidebotham & Son, 
Inc. v Chandler, 183 Cal. App.2d 823, 
7 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1960). 
5. See Beyerbach v. Juno Oil Co., 42 
Cal. 2d at 23, 265 P.2d at 8 (1954); 
Ballantine, Abuse oj Shareholders Pri-
vate Suits: How Far is California's New 
"Security jor Expenses" Act Sound Reg-
ulation, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 399 (1949); 
Comment, 1 V.C.L.A. L. Rev. 79, 80-
81 (1953). 
6. Cal. Corp. Code § 830 allows cor-
porations to indemnify directors, offi-
cers, or employees for expenses incurred 
in the defense of suits arising out of a 
position in, or activities undertaken on 
behalf of, the corporation under speci-
fied conditions. 
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virtue of a suit's mere existence rather than its merits,7 since 
the alternative might be lengthy and costly litigation. On the 
other hand, the security requirement could be an offensive 
weapon in the hands of a wrongdoing corporation, officer or 
director. Where a plaintiff has meager economic resources 
behind a meritorious, good-faith attempt to correct an abuse 
of corporate power, the security requirement might provide 
a technique for nipping in the bud any controversy over 
improper corporate activities. 8 The technique of making a 
motion for security might also provide a costly delaying tactic 
that could have the collateral effect of forcing a legitimate 
suitor out of the courts, even if the motion proves unsuccessful. 
The legislature has now amended section 834 to provide 
a maximum for the security amount that can be fixed by the 
court. The order fixing the nature and initial amount of the 
security may not exceed $25,000, and the total amount result-
ing from discretionary increases allowed by the statute as the 
action progresses may never exceed $25,000. 
The amendment also provides a technique whereby the 
plaintiff can eliminate the hearing on a motion for security, 
with its attendant delay and cost. In response to an allegation 
by a moving party that the situation is such that security 
should be required by the court, the plaintiff may choose 
to post a bond in the maximum amount prior to the holding 
of the hearing on the motion, and thereby obviate the neces-
sity for such a hearing. Unless the plaintiff chooses to post 
a bond in the maximum amount of security, the nature of the 
security is at the discretion of the court, and other assets of 
the plaintiff may be accepted. 9 
Even given these plaintiff-oriented amendments, however, 
it is unlikely that persons who bring spurious litigation, but 
lack some independent wealth, are apt to receive succor from 
the limit on security. Once a court has found that "there 
is no reasonable possibility that the . action . 
7. See Cohen v. Beneficial Loan, 337 
U.S. 541, 548, 93 L.ed. 1528, 1537, 69 
S.Ct. 1221, 1226 (1949); Comment, 3 
Stan. L. Rev. 151, 153-54 (1950). 
8. See Hornstein, New Aspects oj 
16 CAL LAW 1967 
Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 Col. 
L. Rev. 1, 2-7, 31-32 (1947). 
9. Cal. Corp. Code § 834(b)(2); 
Beyerbach v. Juno Oil Co., 42 Ca1.2d 
at 26-27, 265 P.2d at 10-11 (1954). 
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will benefit the corporation or its security holders,,,lo it is 
unlikely that the plaintiff would be able to find a surety willing 
to advance the necessary funds. 
Those persons initiating derivative suits did not similarly 
benefit from judicial change during 1967 in the law of section 
834. If a security amount was repressive,11 plaintiffs in the 
past had sought and received appellate review of the security 
order. 12 In a carefully reasoned decision in Woodman v. 
Ackerman,13 the first district (Ellington, J.) held that such 
an order is not appealable. The court reasoned that either 
the order setting security or the judgment of dismissal, if the 
security is not posted, is appealable, but not both. Since the 
trial court may alter its order setting security prior to the 
judgment of dismissal, and since the judgment of dismissal is 
without prejudice, the court held that hearing the issue only 
in the form of an appeal from the judgment of dismissal 
would best further the interests of justice. The decision has 
particular validity now that a maximum security amount has 
been legislatively imposed on the security. Although it results 
in a restraint from interposition of appellate review until 
the trial court has made its final determination in the matter, 
the likelihood of imposition of a repressive security is now 
reduced and the derivative suitor is subject to no worse 
penalty than a delay in the final resolution of his allegations. 
One other change in shareholder power that should be 
noted is that the requirements for shareholder approval of 
agreements for merger or consolidation of corporations have 
been altered by amendments to sections 2239, 4107, 4110 
and 4111 of the Corporations Code, which accord with rec-
ommendations made by the State Bar Committee on Corpo-
10. Cal. Corp. Code § 834(b)(1). 
11. The amount set in Woodman v. 
Ackerman, 249 Cal. App.2d 644, 57 
Cal. Rptr. 687 (1967), for instance, was 
$245,000 or almost ten times the 
amount allowable under amended 
§ 834. If this sum represents an ac-
curate estimate of costs, one may argue 
that the legislative ceiling gives little 
2 
real security to defendants and operates 
only to discourage the faint-hearted 
strike suitor. 
12. See Marble v. Latchford Glass 
Co., 205 Cal. App.2d 171, 22 Cal. Rptr. 
789 (1962). 
13. 249 Cal. App.2d 644, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. 687 (1967). 
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rations.14 The effect of the amendments to the four sections 
is to allow shareholders to approve mergers or consolidations 
without a formal meeting. Written consent must be unani-
mous, however, rather than merely by two-thirds approval. 
Corporate Securities: Legislation and Case Development 
Several important amendments to the Corporations Code 
revised the law affecting securities regulation. The most sig-
nificant change was the addition of a provision that allows 
curative permits to be issued by the corporations commissioner 
to alleviate the consequences of an improper security issu-
ance.15 Under prior law, in cases where no permit had been 
issued prior to the sale of a security or where a security 
had been sold in non-conformity with a provision of a permit 
that had been issued, Corporations Code section 26100 had 
rendered the security void. The courts had already mitigated 
the most extreme consequences of the literal statutory lan-
guage of section 26100 by refusing to allow a party who was 
the issuer or in pari delicto with the issuer to have the issue 
declared void.16 Therefore, a security issued without a per-
mit has been viewed as voidable, at the discretion of an 
innocent shareholder.17 
This judicial development left unresolved problems, how-
ever. Unlike many jurisdictions, California's securities law 
14. Comm'r of Corp., Report of the 
Comm'r, 41 Cal. St. B.I. 795 (1966). 
15. Cal. Corp. Code § 25518. 
16. See Domestic & Foreign Petro-
leum Co., Ltd. v. Long, 4 Cal.2d at 
558-61, 51 P.2d at 77-79 (1935); 
Western Oil & Ref. Co. v. Vena go Oil 
Corp., 218 Cal. at 743-45, 24 P.2d at 
975-76, 88 A.L.R. at 1278-80 (1933); 
Eberhard v. Pacific Southwest Loan & 
Mortgage Corp., 215 Cal. 226, 9 P.2d 
302 (1932); Maner v. Mydland, 250 
Cal. App.2d at 529, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 
742-44 (1967). 
17. See Haakh, The Amorphous Con-
cept "Void" of Corporations Code Sec-
18 CAL LAW 1967 
tion 26100, 29 L.A.B. Bull. 292, 293 
(1954); Note, Noncomplying Securities 
in California: Iudicial Protection of 
Interests under Corporations Code 
§ 26100, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 1184 (1966). 
The innocent shareholder may not al-
ways be protected, however; see Reed 
v. Norman, 41 Ca1.2d 17,256 P.2d 930 
(1953). The legislature itself experi-
mented with a "voidable" rule in the 
1930's, which rule included a provision 
for a curative permit. The rule was 
short-lived, however, being in effect only 
from 1931 to 1933. See Dahlquist, 
Regulation and Civil Liability under 
the California Corporate Securities Act: 
III, 34 Cal. L. Rev. 543, 545 (1946). 
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contains no express statute of limitations.Is Unknowing and 
good-faith violations of the permit requirements presented 
grave problems of business uncertainty and operated, often 
unfairly, to give a purchaser an extended option on partici-
pation in the success of the business whose securities he had 
purchased. I9 Again, in those cases where only a technical 
violation of a permit had occurred, some effort had been made 
at mitigating these effects, this time through administrative 
practice. The practice involved the issuance of a new permit 
and a reissuance of stock in consideration of the claims against 
the issuer possessed by holders of the void securities.20 Al-
though the new permit had been described as a curative 
permit,! it was not retroactive2 to the date of issuance. Nor 
was it possible to completely effectuate such a new issue 
without the voluntary permission of all of the security holders, 
some of whom might choose to be recalcitrant and play a 
waiting game with odds heavily stacked in their favor. 3 
Under the new statutory provision, an issuer may apply for 
relief to the division; if the commissioner finds that under 
the circumstances it would be "fair, just and equitable [to 
issue a curative permit] and that the applicant is transacting 
and intends to transact its business fairly and honestly," he 
may obviate the effect of section 26100 by issuing a curative 
permit. 4 Such a permit is effective retroactively as of the 
date the securities concerned were first issued and sold, there-
by validating the original issue.5 Further, when application 
for a curative permit has been made and a prima facie case 
18. Dahlquist, 34 Cal. L. Rev. at 701-
19. 
19. Dahlquist, 34 Cal. L. Rev. at 708; 
Note, 18 Stan. L. Rev., at 1190. Con-
sider, for instance, the potential for 
unfairness presented by the arguable 
ability of franchise holders to avoid 
their obligations under the Commis-
sioner's decision (discussed infra) to 
treat many franchise agreements as 
securities. 
20. Corporation Commissioner, Cur-
ative Permits, 43 Cal. St. B.I. 103, 104 
(1968). 
1. See Wheat, Issuance of Securities 
under the California Securities Law, in 
C.E.B., ADVISING CALIFORNIA BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISES 497, 552-553 (1958). 
2. Non-retroactivity might leave some 
problems unsolved; such as, for in-
stance, the questionable effectiveness of 
corporate acts requiring shareholder ap-
proval taken prior to the new issue. 
See Note, 18 Stan. L. Rev. at 1190. 
3. See Wheat, C.E.B. 497, 552-553. 
4. Cal. Corp. Code § 25518. 
5. Cal. Corp. Code § 25519. 
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for granting a curative permit has been shown, the applicant 
has the right to have stayed any trial "which turns on the 
provisions of section 26100" until the commissioner makes 
a decision on the application.6 This provision would therefore 
allow an issuer surprised by an allegation that his securities 
were void to rectify the matter even at the last minute. 
Curative permits are apt to provide needed protection for 
all parties in transactions where securities law violations 
have taken place, despite good-faith attempts to comply with 
the law. Persons having interests in the enterprise, but no 
relationship with the guilty party, will not be inadvertently 
penalized, and yet the amendments will allow action to be 
taken against parties who have engaged in faulty conduct. 
This result will obtain because the issuance of a curative 
permit renders inapplicable only the voiding provisions of sec-
tion 26100; the curative permit "shall have no effect on the 
criminal liability of any person nor upon any cause of action 
other than that based on the provisions of Section 26100.'" 
The legislature also added language to section 251 OQ, which 
sets forth securities that are exempt from the provisions of the 
Corporate Securities Law. Subsection (a) of section 25100, 
which sets forth exemptions for securities issued by govern-
mental agencies, was amended by adding to the categories 
of governmental agencies exempted any "public district or 
authority, or other public agency, public entity, or public 
corporation therein."8 
Subsection (k) of section 25100, which exempts securities 
issued under the Federal Bankruptcy Act, was also amended 
by adding the words "or plan of arrangement" to the provi-
sion for exemption of securities "issued under or pursuant to 
6. Cal. Corp. Code § 25521. 
7. Cal. Corp. Code § 25520. 
8. This exemption does not ordinarily 
apply to transactions of brokers 
(§ 25101). Because § 25602 requires 
the submission to the commissioner of 
"advertisements" (see § 25600) for the 
sale of securities for possible disap-
proval (§§ 25602,25603), brokers would 
be required to submit advertising re-
20 CAL LAW 1967 
lated to otherwise exempt public body 
securities absent a specific exemption in 
§ 25602. In order to retain a con-
gruity between exemptions affecting 
public agency securities, securities which 
are free themselves from regulation by 
the commissioner of corporations, 
§ 25602 was also amended to render its 
exemption provision for such securities 
identical with that of § 25100(a). 
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a plan of reorganization. " The legislature declared, 
however, that neither the amendment to subsection 25100(a) 
or subsection 25100(k) should be construed as making any 
substantive change in the existing law.9 
An addition to the exemption provisions that did work a 
change in the existing law is contained in paragraph 2 of 
new subsection (0) of section 25100. That subsection deals 
with life income contracts issued by "a company organized 
exclusively for educational, benevolent, fraternal, 
charitable, or reformatory purposes and not for pecuniary 
profit. ." to persons who donate property to the organ-
ization. The contract is essentially an annuity for either the 
donor or a person designated by the donor. Paragraph 1 
of subsection (0) specifically exempts all such contracts that 
were issued prior to the amendment. Here again, the legis-
lature stated that this exemption provision was only declara-
tive of existing law.10 
Future contracts in this category will not automatically 
be exempt from the provisions of the Corporate Securities 
Law, however. An organization desiring to issue such con-
tracts without a permit must now seek an exemption for the 
organization by order of the commissioner. He is empowered 
to allow such an exemption for the particular issuer rather 
than the particular security, if he finds 
that such company is of such size or has such invest-
ment experience or capability that the protection of the 
public otherwise provided by the issuance of a permit 
is not required, and that the exemption of such agree-
9. Cal. Stats., ch. 1411, § 3 (1967). 
Whether the additional language of 
§ 25100(a) in fact only reflects the previ-
ous law is not a question beyond dis-
pute. Although no judicial opinion 
was located that held otherwise, the 
Attorney General suggested in an opin-
ion on Sept. 8, 1966 (before recalling 
it on Oct. 7, 1966) that the exemption 
did not apply to "securities of state 
authorities, agencies, districts, or sim-
ilar bodies without taxing powers .... " 
48 Op. Att'y Gen. 90, 92 (1966). This 
opinion, which reached the same result 
as to the scope of the exemptions of 
§ 25602, was in large part based on the 
specific statutory enumeration of ex-
empt bodies followed by a general ex-
emption for a "taxing district." The 
amendments to both § 25100(a) and 
§ 25602 deleted the phrase "taxing dis-
trict." 
10. Cal. Stats. ch. 1411, § 3 (1967). 
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ments, contracts or other arrangements offered or issued 
by such company is in the public interest.ll 
Some degree of control is now exercised over such arrange-
ments, therefore, where previously none existed. 
The legislature took a rather firm position with respect to 
another type of organization that may well be both educa-
tional and nonprofit in nature, a company organized for the 
"promotion, development or operation of a world's fair.,,12 
New section 25102.5 of the Corporations Code not only re-
moves a general exemption for securities of such an issuer, 
it eliminates the availability of statutory provisions of general 
application that would ordinarily exempt the types of securi-
ties enumerated from the provisions of the Corporate Securi-
ties Law. A world's fair company is now denied exemptions 
available to other issuers for certain securities of nonprofit 
organizations, which include commercial paper issued in the 
ordinary course of legitimate business, and promissory notes 
that are issued in a private offering.13 
The Court of Appeal for the Second District judicially 
defined the scope of section 25100 (I) during the past year. 
That section exempts from the provisions of the Corporate 
Securities Law "any partnership interest in a general partner-
ship, or in a limited partnership where certificates are exe-
cuted, filed, and recorded as provided by sections 15502 and 
15525 . . . , except partnership interests when offered to 
the public." 
In Solomont v. Polk Development CO.,14 plaintiffs sought, 
among other things, rescission of a partnership agreement 
allegedly based on fraud and, based on the void security 
provisions of section 26100, recovery of amounts paid by 
11. Cal. Corp. Code § 25100(0)(2). 
The fee for obtaining an order for such 
an exempt status is $50.00 (Cal. Corp. 
Code § 26018). 
12. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD RE-
PORT, Jan. 3, 1966, at 8. If experience 
is any teacher, one may profit vicarious-
ly from the New York World's Fair 
venture and conclude that some of such 
22 CAL LAW 1967 
organizations not only are nonprofit, 
but that they present a considerable in-
vestment risk for those who purchase 
their securities. 
13. See Cal. Corp. Code §§ 25102(a), 
(b) and (c). 
14. 245 Cal. App.2d 488, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. 22 (1966). 
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them into the partnership. The partnership at issue had been 
formed by defendant company and other individuals who 
had been solicited by an agent of defendant. The purpose 
of the partnership was to construct and operate a fifty-unit 
apartment building. Partnership interests were sold to plain-
tiffs in a transaction wherein misrepresentations were made 
as to the total cost of the building. After completion of the 
building and its operation for three years, the partnership 
became insolvent and plaintiffs brought the action to recover 
their investment. The judgment, as affirmed by the court of 
appeal, allowed plaintiffs to recover the amount of their con-
tributions less receipts from operation of the apartment build-
ing that had been turned over to them. The opinion contains 
several threads of analysis, only some of which bear on 
whether a permit to issue the partnership interests should have 
been obtained. 
The court's holding that a permit was necessary was based 
on three factors. First, the court held that failure of defend-
ant to comply with the specific provisions of section 15502, 
which sets forth the filing requirements for a certificate of 
limited partnership, foreclosed the business transaction from 
being a valid partnership. Next, the court held that the mis-
representation in the formation of the partnership rendered 
it one induced by fraud and it was, therefore, void ab initio. 
Finally, citing Rivlin v. Levine/5 the court held that the 
business formed could not have been a partnership within 
the meaning of section 25100 ( 1) because the partners were 
individually solicited and therefore "did not have the right of 
mutual selection of all their copartners.,,16 
The court reached the correct result in the case, but it 
seems that some of its language in discussing the above three 
factors may create an unnecessary ambiguity in partnership 
law and the scope of the securities law exemption for partner-
ship interests. With regard to whether a party is deprived of 
the exemption of 25100 ( 1) because of a failure to fully 
comply with the provisions of sections 15502 and 15525, it 
15. 195 Cal. App.2d 13, 15 Cal. Rptr. 16. 245 Cal. App.2d at 492, 54 Cal. 
587 (1961). Rptr. at 25. 
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is submitted that the preferable analysis is contained in F arns-
worth v. Nevada-Cal Management, Ltd.17 That case exam-
ined the purposes of the Corporate Securities Law exemption 
for partnerships and stated "that any abortive attempt to 
form such an organization [limited partnership] results in a 
general partnership and [t]hus all types of partner-
ships are exempt from application of the Corporate Securi-
ties Law provided the interests therein are not offered to the 
public.,,18 The court in Solomont based its conclusion on 
the disparate purposes of the statutes involved. Both the 
securities law and the limited partnership law operate to 
protect the public, but the purpose of the former is to protect 
the public from insubstantial investment schemes. So far 
as part of its purpose is public protection, the Limited Part-
nership Act protects the public dealing with partnerships from 
an unpublicized assertion of limited liability by members of 
the partnership19 and is effective without invoking the securi-
ties law. The court did not discuss the Farnsworth analysis. 
Insofar as the implication of Solomont is that failure to comply 
with the filing provisions under the act results in retroactive 
automatic activation of legal rules designed to regulate trans-
actions among investors inter sese, the court's analysis appears 
to be potentially troublesome. 
The second concept, that a fraud in the formation of the 
partnership renders the partnership void ab initio for purposes 
of the securities law, has little support in California law. 
The unreported case, Miller v. Kraus,20 cited as an authority 
in Solomont, did not involve a securities law question. It 
announced and expanded upon a theory of voidness ab initio, 
but the order of the California Supreme Court denying a 
rehearing20a cast considerable doubt on the validity of the anal-
17. 188 Cal. App.2d 382, 10 Cal. eral rule under the Uniform Limited 
Rptr. 531 (1961). Partnership Act is to the contrary. See 
18. 188 Cal. App.2d at 386, 10 Cal. United States v. Coson, 286 F.2d at 
Rptr. at 533. The language in Farns- 461-62, n. 13 (9th Cir. [1961]). 
worth was over broad in labelling the 19. See 2 Rowley, PARTNERSIDP 562 
resulting business form a general part- (2d ed. 1960). 
nership for all purposes, for aside from 20. 155 P. 834 (Cal. App. 1915). 
the soundness of the Farnsworth analy- 20a. Miller v. Krause, 155 P. 838 
sis vis-a-vis the securities law, the gen- (1916). 
24 CAL LAW 1967 
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ysis. A general rule of voidability of the partnership by the 
particular person defrauded is well recognized, but it controls 
only the rights between the immediate parties. The rule, for 
instance, does not affect a defrauded partner's rights vis-a.-vis 
liability to third parties, nor does it affect the rights of part-
ners who were not defrauded inter sese.! The remedy for 
the defrauded partner is rescission and restitution under either 
the concept of recovery based on a theory of failure to obtain 
the necessary permits, a violation of the Corporate Securities 
Law that brings into play section 26100, or under the concept 
of a recovery based on a fraudulent creation of the partner-
ship. It would seem unnecessary, therefore, to speak of the 
entire partnership entity as void and to invoke the Corporate 
Securities Law in order to reach the proper result. 
Admittedly such a rule produces a poetic justice of sorts. 
The securities law is designed to protect the public from fraud 
in those transactions it covers and the court's rule would auto-
matically bring some typically exempt transactions within the 
scope of the law if fraud were involved. But there is an 
"overkill" potential in reaching the result through section 
26100, in the possible exposure of persons to criminal sanc-
tions where none were intended.2 Further, the effect of such 
a rule on other members of the voided partnership, who may 
have engaged in no fraud in the transaction, is not clear. 
The third line of analysis, that of the mutual selection re-
quirement, was considered separately from the two preceding 
analyses. 3 The holding that an essential element of a true 
limited partnership is the mutual selection of all members 
of the limited partnership is based on a California case, the 
holding of which was primarily based on a leading article 
1. See Crane, PARTNERSHIP, § 85 
(1952); 1 Rowley, PARTNERSHIP, 751-53 
(2d ed. 1960). 
2. See Cal. Corp. Code §§ 26103, 
26104. Unlike the proposed Corporate 
Securities Law (Assembly Bill 1, 1968 
Reg. Sess. Calif. Legis. [1968]), under 
which the civil and criminal liability 
provisions are applicable even to ~xempt 
securities, the current securities law 
provides exemptions from all its provi-
sions. 
3. "Wholly apart from the mutual 
selection test of Rivlin, . • • the 
entity was not an exemption within 
the meaning of section 25100. . . ." 
245 Cal. App.2d at 495, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
llt 26" 
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dealing with corporate securities. 4 As the author of that 
article points out, however, the governing statute indicates 
that a right of mutual selection is not a sine qua non of a valid 
limited partnership, for the business relationship may be con-
structed so as to limit that right and, instead, to allow substi-
tution of limited partners without the consent of other part-
ners.5 It has been noted that a limited partner has little 
interest in the selection of other partners because of his rela-
tive lack of participation in management or control.6 The 
reason for the mutual selection rule, therefore, thus does not 
seem to dispose persuasively of the existence or nonexistence 
of a limited partnership.7 
It cannot be denied that the right of mutual selection is a 
force persuasive of the lack of need for regulation under the 
securities law,S but it does not seem that exercise of that right 
4. Dahlquist, Regulation and 'civil 
Liability under the California Corporate 
Securities Act, 33 Cal. L. Rev. 343, 
363 (1945). 
5. See Cal. Corp. Code §§ 15018, 
15502(a)X, XI, 15519(4). Absent an 
agreement to the contrary, permitted by 
these statutory provisions, the rule is 
clear that "no person can become a 
member of a partnership without the 
consent of all the partners." Cal. Corp. 
Code § 15018(g). 
In deciding whether a partnership 
interest was within the scope of the 
Illinois and federal security laws, an 
Illinois court recently said: 
"The general rule that new members 
of a partnership . . . must be known 
to and approved by the existing mem-
bers of the group is subject to the 
agreement on which the relationship is 
based. [citation] In the instant case, 
it was clear from the communications 
between [the initiator and an investing 
partner] that the members of the group 
were not specifically identified for the 
plaintiff and the size of the group was 
not fixed at the time the plaintiff joined. 
We take it that the plaintiff joined with 
this knowledge, which in effect became 
26 CAL I,.AW 1967 
a part of the informal agreement on 
which the venture was based." Polikoff 
v. Levy, 55 Ill. App.2d at 336, 204 
N.E.2d at 810 (1965). 
Dahlquist, supra n. 4 cited the re-
quirements for the signatures of all 
members on amendments to the part-
nership certificate (Cal. Corp. Code 
§ 15525), apparently to substantiate his 
discussion of the requirement for unan-
imous approval, but such approval was 
not necessary then, as he pointed out. 
Not even the signatures are required 
now in some cases (Cal. Corp. Code 
§ 15525.5), even in those situations 
where approval of all partners is nec-
essary. 
6. See 2 Rowley, PARTNERSHIP 549 
(2d ed. 1960); Crane, PARTNERSHIP 34 
(2d ed. 1952). 
7. Compare the rules responsive to 
the actual business relationship between 
"partners" developed for the special 
business form called a "mining partner-
ship." Skillman v. Lachman, 23 Cal. at 
206, (1863); Pub. Res. Code, §§ 2351-
2361. 
8. See Dahlquist, 33 Cal. L. Rev. at 
361-67. 
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should be essential to the existence of a valid limited partner-
ship. Such a criterion might better be applied as a factor in 
determining whether the offering of the limited partnership 
interests was private or public. 9 
The Attorney General issued an unpublished opinion during 
1967 interpreting the scope of another exemption of the 
Corporate Securities Law, that covering "a beneficial inter-
est issued by a retirement system. ,,10 The opinion 
analyzes whether a stock bonus plan as part of a retirement 
system is permissible when it contains certain withdrawal 
provisions. The provisions under consideration allowed with-
drawal of both the employee and employer contributions on 
termination of employment, but only as much of the latter 
as had "vested"; withdrawal at any time of the employee 
contribution only, with suspension from participation for one 
year as a consequence; and withdrawal of either the employee 
or employer contribution in time of personal need, as deter-
mined by an administrative committee, with no penalty. 
The Attorney General had previously held that other plans 
containing withdrawal provisions did not qualify for the 
exemption. The plan here under scrutiny by the Attorney 
General, unlike previous plans submitted to the Attorney 
General for opinion, contained more stringent deterrents to 
withdrawal. The employee, for instance, could ordinarily 
withdraw all of his stock only by quitting his job; withdrawal 
of portions of his contributions would cause him to be sus-
pended from participation in the plan for a year; and a third 
permissible type of withdrawal could occur only under limited 
circumstances. The Attorney General stated, therefore, that 
such contributions of stock to a retirement system, where the 
primary purpose was to provide benefits on retirement, was 
permissible and within the scope of the exemption. Although 
the withdrawal privileges provided collateral benefits, the lim-
9. In this regard see the discussion relationship between the issuer and the 
of factors used by the Commissioner offerees." 
in such an evaluation, infra, particu- 10. Cal. Corp. Code § 28006; 49 Op. 
larly those of (1) "the relationship of Att'y Gen. 144 (June 28, 1967). 
the offerees to each other," and (2) "the 
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itations on those privileges rendered them consistent with the 
primary purpose. 
Lastly, the legislature provided additional protection to the 
security-buying public by tightening the requirements for 
brokers. California's Corporate Securities Law has long had 
a provision for bonding as a prerequisite for favorable action 
on an application for a brokerage certificate. A surety may 
cancel the broker's bond, however, provided that he gives 
thirty days' written notice to the commissioner. In order to 
protect the public from a broker who might have a broker's 
certificate and yet may no longer have a bond, language 
has been added to section 25703 that makes failure to file 
a replacement bond prior to termination of the old bond 
sufficient reason for suspension or revocation of the broker's 
certificate. It further provides that in those cases where a 
new bond has not been filed prior to the issuance of the 
notice of a hearing for suspension or revocation of the certif-
icate, such hearing may be in an abbreviated form.ll 
Corporate Securities: Commissioner Action 
Perhaps as important as formal statutory amendments are 
the regulations and other guidelines, in the form of bulletins, 
that are issued by the commissioner of corporations in accord-
ance with the authority vested in him by Corporations Code 
section 25308. Several of the changes made administratively 
in the past year affected areas long recognized as needing 
change. The rules are steps in the direction of goals cur-
rently sought through legislative amendment of the securities 
law, and may well be precursors of such legislative change. 
The most significant change was the introduction of a new 
"legend condition" to be used when permits are applied for 
by corporations seeking to engage in an initial and private 
11. Although the hearing need not 
comply with the full provisions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act under 
these circumstances, its procedure is 
nevertheless subject to minimum princi-
ples of due process. Abrams v Daugh-
erty, 60 Cal. App. at 299-304, 212 P. 
at 943-45 (1922); see Endler v. Schutz-
28 CAL LAW 1967 
bank, 68 Cal.2d -, 65 Cal. Rptr. 297, 
436 P.2d 297 (1968); Drummey v. State 
Bd. of Funeral Dirs., 13 Cal.2d at 80, 
87 P.2d at 851 (1939); Suckow v. Alder-
son, 182 Cal. at 250, 187 P. at 966 
(1920); Angelopulos v. Bottorff, 76 Cal. 
App. at 625-28, 245 P. at 448-50 (1926). 
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offering of their securities.12 The new technique substitutes 
a legend condition where the commissioner would previously 
have imposed an escrow condition.13 The legend condition 
requires imprinting on the security a legend prohibiting trans-
fer of the security, without the consent of the commissioner,14 
except to specified transferees. The commissioner stated, 
"The legend condition, by eliminating the requirement of an 
escrow holder, will eliminate the expense to companies, attor-
neys and the Commissioner incident to the maintenance of an 
escrow holder [and] in most cases would serve 
equally to protect the public against secondary transfers."15 
The commissioner encourages applicants to use shortened 
form applications, devised by the commissioner, for a permit 
with a legend condition if the proper criteria are met. To 
meet the criteria the applicant must be a California corpora-
tion which has no securities outstanding, and which does not 
12. The original versions of the pro-
visions applicable to the new legend 
condition were promulgated by Com-
missioner of Corporations Bulletins 
Nos. 67-3, 67-4 and 67-7. After minor 
revisions, they were promulgated in 
final form, to be effective November 22, 
1967, as Title 10, California Adminis-
trative Code, sections 320.6, 407.2, 
407.3 and 419. These implementing 
regulations are expected to have a 
broad impact, since it is estimated that 
they will affect between ten and eleven 
thousand applications annually, or as 
much as 60 percent of the original issue 
applications handled by the commis-
sioner. 
13. A proposed amendment to the 
Corporations Code will exempt security 
issues of the type covered by these rules 
from the necessity of seeking any per-
mit, provided that a prescribed legend 
is imprinted on the face of the security. 
Assembly Bill 1, 1968 Reg. Sess. Calif. 
Legis. § 25102(h) (1968). 
14. The legend currently prescribed 
reads as follows: "IT IS UNLAWFUL TO 
CONsUMMATE A SALE OR TRANSFER OF 
THIS SECURITY, OR ANY INTEREST THERE-
IN, OR TO RECEIVE ANY CONSIDERATION 
THEREFOR, WITHOUT THE PRIOR WRIT-
TEN CONSENT OF THE COMMISSIONER 
OF CORPORATIONS OF THE STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA, NAMING BOTH TRANSFEROR 
AND TRANSFEREE, EXCEPT THAT TRANS-
FERS MAY BE EFFECTED WITHOUT SUCH 
CONSENT TO THE TRANSFEROR'S PARENTS, 
CHILDREN, GRANDCHILDREN, SPOUSE, 
AND CUSTODIANS OR TRUSTEES FOR THEIR 
ACCOUNT, OR TO HOLDERS OF SECURITIES 
OF THE SAME CLASS OF THE ISSUER OF 
THIS SECURITY, ON CONDITION THAT ANY 
CERTIFICATE EVIDENCING THIS SECURITY 
ISSUED TO SUCH TRANSFEREE SHALL CON-
TAIN THIS LEGEND CONDITION." 
Because the content of the legend 
changed twice in the seven months be-
tween its initial and latest promulgation, 
counsel must insure that the legend im-
printed on any given security is the 
precise legend authorized by the permit. 
If use of the current legend is desired 
in cases where the permit authorizes an 
older form, an amendment to the per-
mit must be obtained. 
15. Commissioner of Corporations 
Bull. 67-3, at 1. 
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propose to use any prospectus or advertisement or to pay 
any commission or compensation for the sale of its securities. 
It must also be one "whose securities are to be sold to not 
more than five issuees,16 each of whom is either an officer or 
director of the issuer, or related to an officer or director as 
a parent, child, grandchild, spouse, and custodian or trustee 
for their account.,,17 While the language of the rule seems 
applicable to natural persons only, the rule is also meant to 
apply in cases where the issuee is a corporation. IS The sub-
stitution of the legend condition will be of economic advan-
tage whether or not transfers take place, but it should be 
noted that the normal legend condition allows transfers to 
be effected without the consent of the commissioner when the 
transfer is made to "the transferor's parents, children, grand-
children, spouse, and custodians or trustees for their account, 
or to holders of securities of the same class of the issuer of 
this security. "19 This provision obviates the necessity 
for applying for a consent to transfer securities subject to the 
legend condition in the instances enumerated,20 and of course 
16. The legend condition was orig-
inally available only where there was 
to be but one issuee (Commissioner of 
Corporations Bull. No. 67-7), but its 
availability was later expanded to ap-
plication contemplating the present 
maximum of five issuees. The increase 
in scope of this simplified condition pro-
cedure may be ascribed to the commis-
sioner's general effort to reduce the 
burdens on businessmen and the divi-
sion of corporations in areas where 
stringent regulation was felt to be rela-
tively unnecessary. A collateral benefit, 
of course, is the freeing of the division's 
resources so it might concentrate its 
regulatory efforts in areas where the 
potential for fraud and abuse are the 
greatest. See generally Volk, Fifty 
Years of Securities Regulation in Cali-
fornia, 42 L.A.B. Bull. 569, 571-72 
(1967). 
17. 10 Cal. Admin. Code § 320.6. 
18. See part I(b)(1) of the application 
at 10 Cal. Admin. Code § 320.6. 
30 CAL LAW 1967 
19. 10 Cal. Admin. Code § 407.3. 
The original legend condition contained 
no provision for transfer without con-
sent (Commissioner of Corporations 
Bull. Nos. 67-3, 67-4). The permis-
sive provision was likely added for the 
reasons set forth above in the discus-
sion of the change in the number of is-
suees permissible. The addition of such 
terms to the legend condition is not 
without precedent in the practice of the 
division of corporations. A similar 
"special family escrow condition" was 
previously granted under certain cir-
cumstances, which condition allowed 
limited transfers of securities subject to 
an escrow condition without a formal 
order from the commissioner. 2 Bal-
lantine & Sterling, CALIFORNIA CORP. 
LAWS, § 450.02 (1967). 
20. The first resale of stock subject 
to a legend condition by a corporate 
issuee would, of course, require the con-
sent of the commissioner in all in-
stances, since that transfer could not be 
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eliminates the expense of preparation and the statutory fee 
associated with such an application. 
The commissioner is giving the legend condition the broad-
est scope possible. It is applicable not only to new issues; 
it may also be substituted in a proper case for an escrow 
condition currently imposed upon outstanding securities by 
applying for an amendment to the original permit under sec-
tion 26009.1 Because the legend condition is expected to 
become the norm, the commissioner suggests that applicants 
who desire a formal escrow condition in lieu of the legend 
condition should so specify that fact in their applications.2 
It should be noted that the application form must contain 
the statement by any proposed issuee that "he has not been 
solicited to invest in applicant by any person," and must 
further contain an amplified statement of the issuee's rela-
tionship to the applicant. The proper forms for the applica-
tion and the issuee's statement are set forth in title 10, 
section 320.6 of the California Administrative Code.3 These 
statements will be accorded great weight by the commissioner 
in determining whether the transaction is "fair, just and equi-
table." Statements similar to those now required of proposed 
issuees have been required from proposed transferees in the 
past and have been utilized in reviewing applications by secu-
rity holders for a consent to transfer a security subject to an 
escrow condition.4 Where a consent to transfer is necessary, 
the requirements of section 419 have been extended to en-
compass applications for a consent to transfer securities sub-
ject to a legend condition.s 
one authorized by the terms of the 
legend. 
1. Commissioner of Corporations 
Bull. 67-3, at 1. 
2. Commissioner of Corporations 
Bull. 67-3, at 2. 
3. Unlike some S.E.C. forms, those 
associated with the legend condition are 
not simply exemplars. To further 
simplify the permit application process 
for both the division and the applicant, 
the forms found in the administrative 
code for the application for permit, 
statement of issuee, and statement of 
transferee may be obtained from the 
commissioner's office and may be com-
pleted merely by filling in the blanks. 
See Form, 43 Cal. St. B. J. 106 (1968). 
4. 10 Cal. Admin. Code § 419. 
5. Section 26005 of the Corporations 
Code, which stipulated the fee to be 
charged for an application for an order 
consenting to the transfer of securities 
held in escrow, was similarly amended 
by adding language so that it will im-
pose the same fee for a consent to a 
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Although the decision whether to impose a legend or escrow 
condition is discretionary, the commissioner established guide-
lines by setting forth situations which, if existent, will result 
in the denial of a legend condition and an imposition of an 
escrow condition.6 A legend condition will be denied by the 
commissioner if the shares are subject to waiver conditions 
applicable to promotional shares or if enumerated persons 
closely connected with the issuance of the securities have been 
convicted, within the preceding five years, of either a mis-
demeanor concerning a security, a theft, or any felony, or 
have been enjoined from engaging in activities in connection 
with the purchase or sale of securities. Two additional para-
graphs to section 407.2 allow the commissioner to refuse to 
grant the legend condition in those situations where he deems 
it to be in the public interest to do so, either because he antici-
pates a statutory violation or for "other good cause." 
The legislature added language to existing section 25509 
to make administratively less burdensome the commissioner's 
duties with respect to securities still held by him in escrow. 
The legislature directed that in those cases where the com-
missioner acts as escrow holder for securities subject to an 
escrow condition, he may destroy the certificates in his pos-
session if the corporation that issued the securities is suspended 
for a period of not less than two years for nonpayment of 
taxes or for other penalties. To protect the security holder, 
however, the commissioner is required to keep careful records 
of each certificate he destroys under the provisions of this 
amended section, and such records "constitute prima facie 
evidence as to the matters therein set forth."7 
transfer of securities subject to any 
condition that requires the commis-
sioner's consent to transfer. The sec-
tion therefore now includes the legend 
condition within its scope. 
6. 10 Cal. Admin. Code § 407.2. 
7. An issuer must issue a replace-
ment security on application by the 
owner under the provisions of Commer-
cial Code § 8405, but typically the 
32 CAL LAW 1967 
owner is required to post an indemnity 
bond. In order to provide relief from 
the onerous, and in this case unneces-
sary, burden such a bond imposes on 
the owner, it would seem feasible to 
interpret an indemnity requirement as 
unreasonable under circumstances 
where destruction of the certificate is 
verifiable. See Cal. Commercial Code 
§ 8405(2) (c). 
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In another commissioner's bulletin,S entitled "Alternative 
procedure for filing of prospectuses or registration state-
ments: conditional non disapproval for use," the commis-
sioner of corporations initiated a new procedure to assist 
proper state blueskying of issues registered with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and thereby alleviated another 
administrative bottleneck. To understand the effect of the 
new procedure it would be well to discuss briefly the problem 
prevalent prior to the new procedure. 
A registration statement filed with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission automatically becomes effective twenty 
days after filing unless the commission institutes a stop order 
proceeding.9 The registration statements are typically devoid 
of certain price data when originally filed, which data are 
usually not included until the day of, or day prior to, the 
desired offering date, when a final agreement is reached be-
tween the issuer and the underwriters. At that time a "price 
amendment" is filed with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission which incorporates data concerning such items as 
the offering price and underwriting discounts or commissions 
and other selling expenses. The filing of an amendment 
ordinarily starts the twenty-day waiting period running anew. 
If all other factors are in order, however, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission typically accelerates the effective date 
of the registration statement, so that the offering can take 
place immediately. 
Section 25602 of the Corporations Code requires that such 
an "advertisement" be filed with the office of the commissioner 
at least one day prior to use, and it may then be used absent 
notification of disapproval by the commissioner.1o The pru-
dent corporate lawyer would scarcely proceed with an offer-
ing, however, absent some communication indicating non-
disapprova1.ll This requirement created communications 
problems in the final hours preceding a major security offering. 
8. Commissioner of Corporations 11. See discussion of procedures for 
Bull. 67-6. filing of advertising at 2 Ballantine & 
9. Fed. Sec. Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. Sterling, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 
§ 77h (1964). LAWS, § 453 (1967). 
10. Cal. Corp. Code § 25603. 
3 CAL LAW 1967 33 
31
Brandel: Business Associations
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967
Business Associatious 
The commissioner should have sufficient information to be 
able to determine whether the offering would work a fraud 
on investors or would involve unreasonable profit for under-
writers or sellers. Yet his need for a review of the specific 
financial terms of the underwriting is minimal. The com-
mission has now alleviated the issuer's problem by offering 
to grant a conditional nondisapproval of a prospectus or reg-
istration statement, provided that certain information is fur-
nished and conditions are met.12 
The first condition is that the public offering price of the 
security must be committed to be between specified maximum 
and minimum amounts, and the price range may not exceed 
the applicable maximum range acceptable to the commis-
sioner. Next, underwriting discounts or commissions must be 
committed to be not in excess of specified maximum amounts 
or percentages. Third, redemption prices or conversion prices 
must either be specifically set forth or else must be committed 
to be between specified maximum and minimum amounts. 
Further, if the dividend rate or amount of interest payable 
has not been definitely set forth, the rate or amount must be 
committed to be within ten percent of a specified maximum. 
Finally, if any other selling expense has not been definitely set 
forth, the application must state an amount that such expenses 
will not exceed. 
If the conditional nondisapproval is granted, the issuer 
need only file a copy of the final prospectus or registration 
statement within two business days after the effective date 
to comply with section 25602.13 The information con-
tained in the commitments of the application is sufficient to 
enable the commissioner to determine whether the terms of 
the offering might be unfair and a subsequent prompt verifi-
cation that the terms in fact complied with the commitment 
12. This new procedure is intended 
to have no effect on the use of pre-
permit prospectus ("red herrings") by 
brokers. See title 10 Cal. Admin. Code, 
§ 687. See generally 1 Loss, SEcURmES 
REGULATIONS, 187-93, 203-04 (2d ed. 
1961). 
proval, then, is conditioned upon only 
two factors. They are (1) the final 
effectiveness of the registration state-
ment having terms within the commit-
ments as set forth in the application, 
and (2) the subsequent filing within two 
business days of a copy of the final 
13. The commissioner's nondisap- prospectus or registration. 
34 CAL LAW 1967 
32
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/3
Busiuess Associations 
is sufficient to protect the public interest. 14 In order that a 
corporation required to obtain a permit in California, in 
addition to approval of its advertising, is not placed in a dis-
advantageous position for a national issue, the same proce-
dures may be used to obtain a permit, which would have the 
permissible underwriting terms stated in ranges, rather than 
fixed prices.15 The form on which an application for such a 
conditional nondisapproval is to be submitted was promul-
gated as part of the bulletin. 
The commissioner has also used his discretionary authority 
in another fashion to mitigate the administrative burden which 
Corporations Code section 25602 places both on licensed 
security brokers and on the division of corporations. Again 
he implemented a new rule that retains protection for the 
public in situations where it needs protection and yet allows 
a streamlined administrative procedure where other regula-
tory procedures and the internal business of reputable brokers 
will provide a sufficient protection. Hence, advertising need 
not be filed by a licensed security broker when it (1) does 
not contain false or misleading information; (2) is not com-
municated by means of public media; (3) does not concern a 
security subject to an escrow or legend condition; (4) con-
cerns a security that is being offered by the broker as an agent 
only; (5) is approved by a responsible officer of the broker; 
and (6) is retained by the broker for a period of three years 
subject to the review of the commissioner. 16 An exemption 
for licensed security brokers from the conditions of section 
25602 is further provided to eliminate the necessity for filing 
tombstone advertising, 17 or "such other advertising as is 
14. See Loss and Cowett, BLUE SKY 
LAW at 123 (1958). 
15. A similar provision allowing si-
multaneous effectiveness is found in the 
Uniform Securities Act, § 303(C). That 
provision deals with registrations and 
requires notification "by telephone or 
telegram of the date and time when the 
federal registration statement became 
effective and the content of the price 
amendment, . . ." in addition to a 
follow-up filing of the terms of the price 
amendment. Statutory provisions based 
on this section, which would allow a 
similar "qualification by coordination" 
when the S.E.C. registration statement 
became effective, have been proposed to 
the legislature. Assembly Bill 1, 1968 
Reg. Sess. Cal. Legis. §§ 25111, 25300 
(1968). 
16. 10 Cal. Admin. Code § 641. 
17. See 1 Loss, SECURITIES REGULA-
TIONS, 226-32 (2d ed. 1961). 
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defined" by Securities and Exchange Commission rule 134/8 
which relates to securities for which a permit is already in 
effect or for which a nondisapproval prospectus is on file. I9 
Such advertisements are only for the alleged purpose of "iden-
tifying the existence of a public offering and the availability 
of a prospectus and they are not to be selling literature of any 
kind."20 
Such formal changes in commission practices are of much 
assistance to the practicing corporate bar, but also of con-
siderable value are informal guidelines from the commissioner 
that aid corporate lawyers in interpreting the Corporate 
Securities Law and in being aware of commission attitudes. 
The corporate lawyer is often faced with a difficult decision, 
for instance, in trying to resolve whether a permit need be 
obtained for the issuance of a security when a question arises 
about whether his client's proposed offering is public or pri-
vate. I To assist in this analysis, the commissioner of corpora-
tions has published a guideline for determining when securities 
are public in nature.2 Although the commissioner cautioned 
that "the factors listed are not intended necessarily to be ex-
clusive, and that the weight to be given to each of the factors 
will vary from case to case and that the final conclusion is 
thus determined not by an arithmetical procedure, but by 
value judgment," he did list, roughly rank, and discuss six 
factors he deemed significant in making such a determination. 
The first two factors, "the number of offerees" and "the 
relationship of the offerees to each other," both essentially 
deal with the same factor, that is, the number of individual 
components in the group to which an offer is to be made. The 
second factor is related to the first, insofar as a close relation-
ship between the offerees may indicate an exchange of in-
formation and appraisal among them so as to reduce 
effectively the number of individual investor units that are 
18. 17 C.F.R. § 230.134. for either particular issues or issuers if 
19. 10 Cal. Admin. Code § 641(b). the security is not offered to the public. 
20. Uniform Securities Act ReI. 3535 Cal. Corp. Code §§ 25100(1), (m); 25102 
(1955). (c), (d). 
1. Several provisions of the Corpo- 2. Commissioner of Corporations 
rate Securities Law provide exemptions Bull. 67-5. 
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involved as potential purchasers. The third factor is the 
character of "the relationship between the issuer and the 
offerees." Here, a finding of personal confidence of all, or 
most, of the offerees in the issuer would be a factor tending to 
indicate a private offering. 
The fourth factor is the "size of the offering" and relates 
to whether the offering, measured both by the dollar amount 
of the individual security units and the number of units in-
to which the issue is divided, is of a character that would be 
purchased by the general public. Where the individual secu-
rity, for instance, is issued in one million dollar amounts, it 
is clearly foreclosed as an investment opportunity for the 
public, and it can be expected that only a relatively few 
offerees would be interested in such a security or would be 
solicited. Similarly, if a large enough number of units is 
involved so as to permit redistribution to the public, that 
factor may indicate a public offering even though no such 
initial distribution is contemplated. 
The fifth factor, "the manner of the offering," was cited by 
the commissioner as "perhaps the most significant single 
factor" that is applicable to this determination. Significant 
here is whether the issuer or purchaser carries the investment 
initiative and how vigorously it is carried. The media used 
to convey the offer is also important, for it is indicative of 
the group intended to be reached. For example, an offering 
conducted by the use of radio, television, or mass mailings 
would most assuredly be categorized as public in nature. 
The sixth and final factor deals with "the character of the 
security offered." As in the fourth factor, this factor pri-
marily relates to the attractiveness of the security to the 
general investing public. Certain business enterprises, such 
as those in the electronics industry and certain real estate 
developments, attract widespread public interest, whereas 
securities containing unusual or uncommercial arrangements 
can be expected to attract only a relatively limited group of 
investors and only that group can be expected to be solicited. 
The commissioner further stated that he would issue an opin-
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ion in those cases where he can clearly decide whether an 
offering is public in nature.s 
The commissioner issued a second guideline pertaining to 
the applicability of the Corporate Securities Law to the fran-
chise, a form of business gaining increasing currency. The 
guideline4 is based on an opinion solicited from the Attorney 
General by the commissioner. The Attorney General's opin-
ion5 presented a new position on the question of whether 
franchise arrangements constitute securities within the mean-
ing of the Corporate Securities Law.6 The corporations com-
missioner requested the Attorney General's opinion on three 
variations that franchise arrangements might commonly take: 
1. Where the franchisee participates only nominally 
in the franchised business in exchange for a share of 
the profits. 
2. Where the franchisee participates actively in the 
franchised business and where the franchisor agrees to 
provide certain goods and services to the franchisee. 
3. Where the franchisee participates actively in the 
franchised business and where the franchisor agrees to 
provide certain goods and services to the franchisee, 
but where the franchisor intends to secure a substantial 
portion of the initial capital that is needed to provide 
such goods and services from the fees paid by the fran-
chisee or franchisees. 7 
As to the first situation, the Attorney General stated that 
the investor primarily purchased the right to share in proceeds 
3. Such an opinion, and the bulletins 
themselves, are of a limited value (see 
Bank of Alameda County v. McColgan, 
69 Cal. App.2d 464, 159 P.2d 31 
[1945]), as compared to formal rules 
issued under the Administrative Pro-
cedures Act, which have the force of 
law. The proposed securities law would 
protect persons who rely on such com-
muniques from liability from acts done 
in good-faith conformity therewith. As-
sembly Bill 1, 1968 Reg. Sess. Calif. 
Legis. § 25700 (1968). Compare Fed. 
Sec. Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78w. 
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4. Commissioner of Corporations 
Bull. 67-8. 
5. 49 Op. Att'y. Gen. 124 (June 2, 
1967). For a more extensive develop-
ment of franchising under the Cali-
fornia Corporate Securities Law, see 
Note, Franchise Regulations under the 
California Corporate Securities Law, 5 
San Diego L. Rev. 140 (1968). 
6. Compare 12 Op. Cal. Att'y. Gen. 
23 (1948). 
7. 49 Op. Cal. Att'y. Gen. 124-25 
(1967). 
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of the franchised business and that the business form "differs 
in name only from the 'limited partnership' agreements that 
were held to be securities in People v. Hoshor."8 He further 
stated that the same result would obtain even if the contract 
permitted the franchisee to elect either an active or only 
nominal role in the actual management of the business. If 
such an option appears in the contract, the Attorney General 
would view it as an offer to sell a security and therefore as 
being within the scope of the Corporate Securities Law. 9 
As to the second situation, it was clear to the Attorney 
General that no security would be involved because "the 
profit will be attributable to the franchisee's own efforts" and 
hence the situation would fall within the category of agree-
ments to which the Corporate Securities Law is not appli-
cable.10 
The third situation has a common element with the second 
situation insofar as the profits derived by the franchisee would 
again be due to his own effort. The Attorney General said, 
however, that the furnishing of initial capital to the franchisor 
"seems to us to be a separate business risk apart from the 
success or failure of the franchisee's conduct of the franchised 
business. . . .'>11 Such a business risk was felt to be within 
the scope of the Corporate Securities Law because, citing 
Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski/2 "its objective is to 
afford those who risk their capital at least a fair chance of 
realizing their objectives in legitimate ventures whether or 
not they expect a return on their capital in one form or an-
other.m3 
8. 49 Op. Cal. Att'y. Gen. at 126. 
For arguments on behalf of not holding 
such a contractual arrangement to be a 
security see Coleman, A Franchise 
Agreement; Not a "Security" under 
the Securities Act of 1933, 22 Bus. Law 
~ 493 (1967). 
For People v. Hoshor see 92 Cal. 
App.2d 250, 206 P.2d 882 (1949). 
9. See Securities & Exchange Comm. 
v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 90 
L.ed. 1244, 66 S.Ct. 1100, 163 A.L.R. 
1043 (1946). 
10. See People v. Syde, 37 Cal.2d at 
768, 235 P.2d at 602-03 (1951). 
11. 49 Op. Cal. Att'y. Gen. 124, 129 
(1967). 
12. 55 Cal.2d at 815, 13 Cal. Rptr. 
at 188, 361 P.2d at 908, 87 A.L.R.2d 
at 1139 (1961). 
13. 49 Op. Att'y. Gen. at 128 (1967). 
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The commissioner adopted these OpInIOnS In Bulletin 
67-8, where they were summarized as follows: 
[AJ franchise constitutes a security subject to the 
permit requirement of the Corporate Securities Law 
where either the franchisee is to take a passive role in the 
franchised business, or a substantial portion of the initial 
risk capital of the franchisor is to be contributed by the 
franchisee. 
The difficult question here, of course, is what constitutes 
the providing of initial capital so as to create an investment 
risk as distinguished from a payment to an established fran-
chisor for the granting of the franchise and the providing of 
goods and services. The Attorney General ventured that 
he could provide no definite guidelines to resolve this question 
and that each case would have to be examined on its merits.14 
The commissioner, however, listed some factors helpful in 
resolving the question. The factors all relate to how well 
established the franchisor is-whether he already has suffi-
cient capital when the franchisee arrives on the scene, whether 
he has a history of successful operation, and whether he al-
ready has an organization adequate to meet his commitments 
to the franchisee. The commissioner thus eliminated some 
of the guesswork regarding the scope of the Corporate 
Securities Law. 
Unincorporated Associations 
The legislature made several changes to the Corporations 
Code and the Code of Civil Procedure that pertain to part-
nerships and other unincorporated associations. A new pare5 
was added to the Corporations Code which defines the legal 
characteristics of, and filing provisions for, unincorporated 
associations. The provisions apply to all "unincorporated 
organizations of two or more persons, whether organized for 
profit or not," except governmental agencies. Governmental 
14. 49 op. Att'y. Gen. at 129 (1967). 15. Cal. Corp. Code §§ 24000-24006, 
to Title 3. 
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agencies may be "persons," however, and therefore com-
ponent parts of unincorporated associations.16 
Corporations Code section 24001 gives an unincorporated 
association an entity status with respect to liability to non-
members for "an act or omission of the association, and 
of its officer, agent or employee acting within the 
scope of his . . . agency . . . ."17 Such entity liability 
arguably already existed in California in torts,18 but probably 
did not exist as to contractual obligations,19 absent express 
statutory provisions to the contrary.20 The provision, how-
ever, specifically leaves undisturbed the law that determines 
liability between an association and its members. Section 
24002 provides that "only the property of the unincorporated 
association may be levied upon under a writ of execution 
issued to enforce a judgment against the association," a re-
sult previously accomplished by Code of Civil Procedure 
section 388. 
Under the provisions of new section 24003 (a) (1) (2), 
an unincorporated association having a regular place of busi-
ness within California may, at its discretion, file a form desig-
nating the location of its principal office in the state and may 
further designate either a natural person or corporation as 
agent for service of process. If the association has no office 
in the state, it may designate an address for receipt of notices. 1 
Subsections (b), (c), and (d) of section 24003 proceed to 
spell out in detail the requirements for the filing of a designa-
tion of an agent or of a principal location within the state 
and the effect of the filing of an amending statement by unin-
corporated associations. If an agent is designated in accord-
16. Cal. Corp. Code §§ 24000(a), (b). 
17. This provision settles any ques-
tion of whether the provision allowing 
suit against an association under its 
common name (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 
§ 388) was merely procedural and hence 
whether any entity liability existed. See 
Comment, Liability of Members and 
Officers of Nonprofit Unincorporated 
Assoc. for Contracts and Torts, 42 
Calif. L. Rev. 812, 814-18 (1954). 
18. See Inglis v. Operating Engineers 
Local Union No. 12, 58 Cal.2d 269, 
23 Cal. Rptr. 403, 373 P.2d 467 (1962). 
19. See Pacific Freight Lines v. Val-
ley Motor Lines, Inc., 72 Cal. App.2d 
505, 164 P.2d 901 (1946); Security-First 
Nat'l Bank v. Cooper, 62 Cal. App.2d 
at 666, 145 P.2d at 729 (1944). 
20. See, for example, Cal. Corp. Code 
§ 21200. 
1. Cal. Corp. Code § 24003(a)(I)(2). 
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ance with the provisions of section 24003, delivery of proc-
ess by hand to such agent constitutes valid service on the 
association. 2 
This provision replaces the procedure of serving one or 
more of the association's members as the primary technique 
for service of process on associations. Service to members 
may still be made if no agent is designated or if the designated 
agent cannot be found at the address specified in the index 
described below. 3 
Corporations Code section 24004 provides for the creation 
and maintenance of an index of statements filed under the 
provisions of section 24003. A filed statement expires "five 
years from December 31 following the date it was filed."4 
The Secretary of State is authorized to destroy any such state-
ment four years after the expiration date (or between nine 
and ten years after the original filing of the statement),5 
and may also delete any reference to the statement from the 
index at that time. 6 This provision will alleviate the problem 
of retention of outdated and inaccurate records. Deletion 
of such information from the Secretary of State's index may 
have adverse effects on a foreign partnership subject to the 
provisions of section 15700, discussed below, because service 
of process may thereafter be made on the Secretary of State 
and actual notice may never occur. Provision is made, how-
ever, for notification by the Secretary of State to any unincor-
porated association that has filed a statement under the 
provisions of section 24003 when the statement has expired 
because of lapse of time7 or because of a resignation of the 
designated agent. s Nevertheless, failure of the Secretary of 
State to accomplish such notification will provide no pro-
tection for an unincorporated association whose statement is 
no longer effective. 9 
Foreign partnerships not having a regular place of busi-
ness in California will be similarly treated. They will be 
2. Cal. Corp. Code § 24003(e); Cal. 6. Cal. Corp. Code § 24004(e). 
Code Civ. Pro. § 411(2.1). 7. Cal. Corp. Code § 24006. 
3. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 411 (2.1). 8. Cal. Corp. Code § 24005. 
4. Cal. Corp. Code § 24003(d). 9. Cal. Corp. Code § 24006. 
5. Cal. Corp. Code § 24004(a). 
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required, under the amended provisions of section 15700, to 
file a designation of agent as provided in new section 24003, 
discussed above. The amendment to section 15700 also 
allows a foreign partnership to designate, in accordance with 
section 24003, a corporation, instead of a natural person as 
was previously required, as agent for the partnership upon 
whom process may be served in the State of California. 1o The 
designations will be indexed as provided in new section 24004. 
If the designation has not been made or if service cannot be 
made on the agent designated in the index, the amended 
section provides for personal service on the Secretary of State, 
as under the previous law. Such personal service, however, 
must now be accompanied by "a written statement signed by 
the party to the action seeking such service, or by his attorney 
setting forth the last-known address of the partnership. 
"11 
Other additions and amendments made in order to clarify 
the legal status of, and procedures applicable to, an unin-
corporated association are found in sections 388, 395.2, 410 
and 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 388 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure makes it clear that any unincor-
porated association "may sue and be sued in the name which 
it has assumed or by which it is known.,,12 Under the pre-
vious law, partnerships and other unincorporated associations 
could be sued, but could not sue,13 in their assumed names. 
New section 395.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes 
the proper venue of an action against an unincorporated as-
sociation identical to that of a corporation if the association 
has filed a statement listing the location of its principal office 
pursuant to section 24003. Under article XII, section 16 
of the California Constitution, the proper venue for the two 
business forms was already identical except that the pro-
10. This amendment gives foreign 
partnerships the same privilege of utiliz-
ing a corporation as its agent for service 
of process that domestic and foreign 
corporations doing business in Califor-
nia have long enjoyed under the provi-
sions of Cal. Corp. Code §§ 3301 and 
6403, respectively. 
11. Cal. Corp. Code § 15700. 
12. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 388(a). 
13. Case v. Kadota Fig Assn., 35 Cal. 
2d at 602, 220 P.2d at 916 (1950); 
Grand Grove of U.A.O.D. v. Garibaldi 
Grove No. 71, 130 Cal. at 119, 62 P. at 
487 (1900). 
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vision for suit "in the county where the principal place of 
business . . . is situated" was thought to be inapplicable 
to associations. 14 
Section 410 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which deals 
with the proper method of service and return of summons, 
has been amended by replacing the phrase "against associates 
conducting business under a common name" with the newly 
defined term "unincorporated association" without working 
any substantive change. Amendments to section 411 set 
forth the proper persons to whom service of process must be 
made in a suit against an unincorporated association.I6 In 
the case of an unincorporated association other than a foreign 
partnership, service shall be made on an agent designated 
by the unincorporated association in accordance with the 
provisions of section 24003 of the Corporations Code. If 
it has chosen not to designate such an agent, or if the agent 
cannot be found at the address specified in the index, then 
service must be made "to anyone or more of the association's 
members and by mailing the copy thereof to the association at 
its last known mailing address. "16 
California's Uniform Limited Partnership Act was changed 
to allow the amendment of a partnership certificate in the 
case where a partnership has twenty-five or more limited 
members by a procedure simpler administratively than that 
previously required. New Corporations Code section 
15525.5 promulgates the new procedure.17 Previously, any 
amendment to a certificate of partnership was required to 
"be signed and acknowledged by all members.,,18 Partner-
ships with more than twenty-five limited partners, however, 
may now effect amendments over the signature of a general 
partner alone, if the partnership certificate so permits. 
Section 15525.5 contains an exceptional provision for those 
cases in which an amendment substitutes or adds a partner; 
14. Juneau Spruce Corp. v. Int'l 
Longshoremen's Union, 37 Cal.2d at 
762, 235 P.2d at 608 (1951). 
15. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 411(2.1), 
411(2.2). 
44 ~AL LAW 1967 
16. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 411(2.1). 
17. Cal. Corp. Code § 15508 was also 
amended to reflect the availability of 
the new technique. 
18, Cal. Corp. Code § 15525(b). 
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it requires signatures of the persons joining and leaving the 
partnership as limited partners. 
The judiciary was relatively inactive in the law of unin-
corporated associations during the past year. The Court of 
Appeal for the Second District, however, held directly for the 
first time that a partnership has no right to recover damages 
inflicted on a member of the partnership by a third party. 
In Sharfman v. State of California/9 the individual plaintiff 
Sharfman was injured as a result of the negligence of the 
State of California. In addition to recovery being sought 
through plaintiff's individual causes of action, the partnership 
in which Sharfman was engaged as a landscape architect 
sought recovery for loss of profits. The partnership relied 
in part on the case of Darmour Productions Corp. v. H. M. 
Baruch Corp.,20 which had held that a corporation may re-
cover damages for a negligent injury to its employee. The 
court pointed out that the recovery in Darmour was based 
on a limited common-law principle that had been codified in 
section 49 of the Civil Code, which forbids "any injury to a 
servant which affects his ability to serve his master. . . ." 
The common-law liability of one who negligently injures a 
servant to the master of that servant is one of a limited num-
ber of relations that creates a right to recovery by a third 
person who might benefit from the services denied him by 
the injury suffered by another. Two similar principles, that 
a husband may recover for loss of services of his wife and 
that a parent may recover for loss of services of his child, 
continue to remain well recognized. The expansion of such 
principles to partnerships would have been an anachronism, 
however, since the principle on which it would be based, 
liability to a master, itself is under attack.1 The probable 
basis for the dissatisfaction with the latter rule is the premise 
that the probability of a negligent person causing such harm 
is remote and unforeseeable. 2 Although the familial re-
19. 253 Cal. App.2d -, 61 Cal. Rptr. 1. See Seavey, Negligent Harln to 
266 (1967). Servant, Wash. U.L.Q. 309 (1956). 
20. 135 Cal. App. 351, 27 P.2d 664 2. See Columbia Taxicab Co. v. 
(1933). Mercurio, 236 S.W. 1096 (C.A. Mo. 
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lationships are to be anticipated, and recovery continues to 
be allowed for injuries in that area, damage to third parties 
resulting from a victim's partnership relationship is not reason-
ably foreseeable and hence falls within the general rule 
that negligent interference with the performance of a con-
tractual relationship between the injured party and a third 
party is not actionable.3 
1921); Prosser, TORTS, 964 (3d ed. 3. See Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 
1964). Ca1.2d 632, 7 Cal. Rptr. 377, 354 P.2d 
1073, 78 A.L.R.2d 813 (1960). 
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